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Reconciling credibility and accountability: How expert bodies achieve 
credibility through accountability processes 
Arguments about the legitimate role of expert bodies in Europe often center on the 
following question: Does their independence help to make policies credible or should 
they be made democratically accountable to principals and stakeholders? This article 
claims this is a false dichotomy. It does so by arguing theoretically that credibility can 
be achieved through accountability processes. Then, drawing on exemplary case 
studies, this article identifies distinctive accountability processes for ensuring 
credibility: revisable competencies, deliberation over institutional design, and 
engagement in public justification. Credibility and accountability are thus not 
conflicting, but co-constitutive aims of delegation to expert bodies. The analysis 
provides European policy makers and others with a guide for thinking beyond the 
FRQWUDVWEHWZHHQµGHPRFUDWLFDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶DQGµLQGHSHQGHQWFUHGLELOLW\¶ 
Keywords: delegation, accountability, credibility, expertise, legitimacy 
Word count: 8.452 
Introduction 
,Q*LDQGRPHQLFR0DMRQHFODLPHGWKDWµWKHGHOHJDWLRQRIUHJXODWRU\SRZHUVWRDQ
LQGHSHQGHQWLQVWLWXWLRQLV«DPHDQVE\ZKLFKJRYHUQPHQWVFDQFRPPLWWKHPVHOYHVWR
regulatory strategies that would not be credible otherwLVH¶S,QWKLVanalysis, the 
main benefit of delegating competences to independent bodies staffed with experts is to create 
µFUHGLEOHFRPPLWPHQWV¶WRSROLFLHVWKDWSROLWLFDOO\µELDVHG¶HOHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWVZRXOG
otherwise change periodically according to electoral demand. Majone (1996, p. 4) recognised 
the problematic implications delegation has for democracy, but also offered an algorithm for 
GHFLGLQJZKLFKSRZHUVFRXOGDQGVKRXOGEHGHOHJDWHGDUJXLQJWKDWµUHGLVWULEXWLYHGHFLVLRQV
can only be legitimated by the will of the majority, while efficient policies are basically 
OHJLWLPDWHGE\WKHUHVXOWVWKH\DFKLHYH¶0DMRQHS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7KHVROXWLRQ«GLYLGHVWKHJHQHUDOSUREOHPLQWRWZRSDUWVILUVWWKHW\SHRILVVXHVWKDW
can be legitimately delegated to independent experts; and, second, the means by which 
indirect accountability may be enforced (Majone, 1996, p. 5) 
0DMRQH¶VDUJXPHQWIRUFUHGLELOLW\YLDLQGHSHQGHQFHFUHDWHGDGLYLGHEHWZHHQVFKRODUV
arguing for agencies to be protected from external interference to secure their credibility 
(Breen & McMenamin, 2013; Elgie & McMenamin, 2005; Keefer & Stasavage, 2003), and 
scholars arguing for increased accountability through parliamentary or governmental 
oversight (Flinders, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2003; Scott, 2000). This article marries the first 
VFKRRO¶VVWUHVVRQFUHGLELOLW\ZLWKWKHVHFRQGVFKRRO¶VIRFXVRQDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRDUJXHWKDW
credibility can and has to be ensured through accountability mechanisms. This approach seeks 
to move debates about the relationship between delegation and accountability beyond the idea 
that they are antithetical.  It also generates criteria for credible agency commitment based on 
three forms of public accountability: institutional reform via central intervention, deliberation 
over institutional design and public justification (see Schillemans, 2011). The article thus 
addresses the question: How can expert bodies ensure and maintain credibility through 
distinct accountability processes?  
We argue that expert bodies struggle for credibility in the context of different types of 
SROLWLFDOSUREOHPVZKLFKZHWU\WRFDSWXUHE\GUDZLQJRQ-UJHQ+DEHUPDV¶
distinction between pragmatic, ethical-political and moral discourses and respective decisions. 
Drawing on three case studies, the article discusses credibility crises faced by expert bodies 
RSHUDWLQJLQWKUHHGLIIHUHQWSROLF\DUHDV$OORIWKHFULVHVVDZWKHUHVSHFWLYHERG\¶VFUHGLELOLW\
challenged and more or less successfully retained through accountability processes. We thus 
offer an argument for improving credibility through accountability processes: revisable 
competencies, meta-deliberation over institutional design, and engagement in public 
justification improve the credibility of expert bodies in the eyes of the public. 
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The remainder of this article proceeds in six sections. First, we argue that it is possible 
to resolve a tension between credibility and accountability to be found in the literature on 
agencies, delegation and expert decision-making. Second, we set out our conceptual 
IUDPHZRUNRIWKUHHIRUPVRIFUHGLELOLW\µFKDOOHQJHV¶EDVHGRQ+DEHUPDV¶WKUHHIRUPVRI
discourse. Third, we set out our process analysis method, rationale for the case studies, and 
data collection strategy. Fourth, we detail the findings from each case study in turn. Fifth, we 
discuss the implications of our argument for accountability practice. We conclude by 
indicating how future research may build upon our view of credibility being closely linked to 
accountability processes.  
The contested credibility of expert bodies 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµFUHGLELOLW\¶LVDFUXFLDODOEHLWRIWHQXQGHILQHGFRQFHSWLQWKHVWXG\RI
delegated expert bodies. Existing conceptions focus on the autonomy of expert bodies from 
electoral pressures, but alVRIURPYHVWHGLQWHUHVWVRULQGXVWU\OREE\LQJ¶&RHQ	7KDWFKHU
2008, p. 53).  
Majone thus assumes that long-term policy goals will be achievable once an agency 
insulated from sectional interests or electoral motivations is given responsibility for decisions 
(Majone, 1996). As Elgie states: 
Governments have an inherent interest to renege on their promises in order to maximise 
their short-term self-interest, usually reelection. However, if governments delegate 
decision-making authority to a non-majoritarian institution (agency), then they show that 
they can be trusted not to intervene in the decision-making process and policymaking 
maybe more optimal (2006, p. 208). 
$NH\TXHVWLRQVWUXFWXULQJSUHYDOHQWDSSURDFKHVWRµDJHQFLILFDWLRQ¶LQ(XURSHDQJRYHUQDQFH
has therefore been identifying whether and where independence as the assumed key to 
credibility is preferable to democratic control through accountability mechanisms (Elgie & 
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0F0HQDPLQ7KHUHLVVWURQJHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWµFUHGLEOHFRPPLWPHQW¶LVDNHy 
motivation behind establishing delegated agencies (Elgie & McMenamin, 2005; Gilardi, 
2002), especially in consensus democracies with multiple veto players (Yesilkagit, 2004).  
<HVLONDJLWSILQGVFOHDUHYLGHQFHWKDWµWKHORJLFEHKLQGWKHFRPPitment problem 
will induce political actors to design administrative organisations that are as effectively as 
SRVVLEOHLQVXODWHGIURPSROLWLFDOLQWHUIHUHQFH¶(OJLHSDOVRILQGVµWKHGHVLUHWR
make a credible commitment, really do[es] seem to explain in large part why non-majoritarian 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHFUHDWHG¶ 
The emphasis on credibility in this literature, and growth of such agencies in practice, 
has provoked a parallel literature on the need for improving democratic accountability in 
µQHWZRUNHG¶RUµSRO\FHQWULF¶JRYHUQDQFH6FRWW6HYHUDODXWKRUVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKH
complex forms of multi-level governance created by the rise of the agencies described above 
KDYHOHGWRDQµDFFRXQWDELOLW\FULVLV¶6FRWWW\SLILHVWKLVYLHZ 
The central problem of accountability arises from the delegation of authority to a wide 
range of public and some private actors, through legislation, contracts or other 
PHFKDQLVPV«'HEDWHVRYHUDFFRXQWDELOLW\KDYHWRJUDSSOHZLWKWKHXQFRPIRUWDEOH
dilemma of how to give sufficient autonomy to these actors for them to be able to achieve 
their tasks, while at the same time ensuring an adequate degree of control (Scott, 2000, p. 
39). 
6FKRODUVKDYHDUJXHGDORQJZLWK6FRWWWKDWWKHUHLVDWHQVLRQEHWZHHQDµSHrceived need to 
LQVXODWHFHUWDLQDFWLYLWLHVIURPSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFH¶DQGDUHDOLW\WKDWµWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
organisations enjoying a degree of autonomy can make the lines of accountability somewhat 
RSDTXHGXHWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµEXIIHU]RQH¶EHWZHHQHOHFWHGSROLWLFLDQVDQGDFWLRQ¶
(Flinders, 2004, p. 898). Papadopoulos (2007, p. 477) intriguingly notes that attempting to 
EDODQFHWKHWZRPD\QRWZRUNLQSUDFWLFHEHFDXVHRIWKHQHHGIRUFUHGLELOLW\µWRFODLP
credibility, [delegated agencies] have to convince of their independence. They should not 
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DSSHDUDVWKHYHKLFOHVRIWKHSUHIHUHQFHVRIDQ\µSULQFLSDO¶WRZKLFKWKH\ZRXOGKDYHWR
DFFRXQW¶$VVXFKWKHSXUHSRWHQWLDOWKDWDGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHGµSULQFLSDO¶SDUOLDPHQWRU
state department) may hold agencies to account may not be enough. Once credibility becomes 
a key criterion for legitimate rule, there is a slippery slope in which delegated agencies gain 
JUHDWHUSRZHUHYHQWXDOO\EHFRPLQJµGHSROLWLFLVHG¶(Fawcett & Marsh, 2014). As 
3DSDGRSRXORVSQRWHVGHOHJDWLRQLVµQRWFRQFHLYHGSULPDULO\LQWHUPVRILWV
potential for democratisation of policy making, but meant as a solution to functional 
SUREOHPV¶3DSDGRSRXORVS7KLVLVZK\GHPRFUDWLFFKDQQHOVIRUSDUWicipation in 
WKHVHERGLHVDUHZHDN:KHUHQHWZRUNHGµSHHU¶DFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUXPVKDYHEHHQLQVWDOOHG
(Romzek, LeRoux and Blackmar, 2012), these explicitly exclude the wider public sphere and 
are often designed to enhance credibility by mainly involving scientific elites (Perez-Duran, 
2017). 
The argument that a focus on credibility leads, in the last instance, to an instigation of 
expert rule has led to an unfortunate bifurcation of debate between those arguing for 
credibility as an enhancing facet of wider democratic governance, and those who reject it in 
favour of clearer lines of accountability. Summarising this debate, Maggetti (2010) argues 
WKDWRQWKHRQHKDQGLPSURYLQJWKHµSURFHGXUDOOHJLWLPDF\RIUHJXODWRU\JRYHUQDQFH>«@
may challenge the [agencies¶@main raison d¶Hࡂ tre, that is, the supposed gains in terms of 
FUHGLELOLW\DQGHIILFLHQF\RIUHJXODWLRQ¶ZKLOHRQWKHRWKHUKDQGµLQGHSHQGHQFHSURGXFHVD
QHWORVVRIOHJLWLPDF\IRUDSROLWLFDOV\VWHP¶0DJJHWWLS7KXV Maggetti concludes 
ZLWKDWKHRUHWLFDOGLOHPPDVXJJHVWLQJWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIDJHQFLHVUHVWVRQµIUDJLOHQRUPDWLYH
IRXQGDWLRQVDQGUDLVHVSRWHQWLDOTXDOPVFRQFHUQLQJLWVVRFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶0DJJHWWL
p. 6). 
This article argues that this theoretical dilemma about the sustainability and normative 
foundations for delegated governance can be addressed by combining and refining the 
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concepts of credibility and accountability. Specifically, we argue that accountability can 
enhance credibility, when 1) credibility is conceptualised as a quality of policy decisions 
(rather than institutions) that must be accepted by the public as credible, and 2) accountability 
LVYLHZHGDVDG\QDPLFSURFHVVLQYROYLQJUHVSRQVHVWRFKDOOHQJHVWRDQH[SHUWERG\¶V
credibility. 
(1) First, agencies need to take decisions that qualify as credible. Credibility is thus a 
property of decisions, but by derivation can become a property of institutions (in 
this case agencies). According to the understanding in this article, a decision is 
µH[WHUQDOO\¶FUHGLEOHif the validity claims it is based upon are made explicit and 
successfully defended. This definition highlights that agency decisions are not only 
FUHGLEOHGXHWRWKHLUVWDIIEHLQJµFRPPLWWHG¶WRWKHPQRUGXHWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
µLQGHSHQGHQFH¶SHUVH5DWKHUFUHGLELOLW\LVWKHTXDOLW\RIDSDUWLFXlar decision or 
piece of advice, which is based on contestable claims that do not carry prima facie 
authority over the public. Externally obtained credibility is necessary, but not 
sufficient for authority. Authority also depends upon other factors, such as those 
VXPPDULVHGLQ&DUSHQWHUDQG.UDXVH¶VFRQFHSWRIUHSXWDWLRQSZKLFK
refers to long-run facets of a body rather than its decisions. As the credible 
FRPPLWPHQWOLWHUDWXUHKLJKOLJKWVLWDOVRUHTXLUHVWKHLQWHUQDOµFRPPLWPHQW¶RID
body to act upon its mandate. Majone recognised that external perceptions of 
FUHGLELOLW\DUHFUXFLDOIRULQGHSHQGHQWDJHQFLHV¶OHJLWLPDF\EXWDVLOOXVWUDWHGDERYH
in the debate around accountability this nuance ought to be reasserted.  
(2) We argue that public accountability can enable achieving credibility in the context 
of challenges. Public accountability, as defined by Bovens (2007, p. 450) refers to 
µa relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
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judgement, and the actor may face consequences¶LWDOLFVLQRULJLQDO7KLV
relationship is characterised as a threefold process of information provision, 
GLVFXVVLRQDQGFRQVHTXHQFHV7KHµIRUXP¶FDQbe towards a central government 
department, or the broader public or media. Critically, however, accountability 
processes are often dynamic rather than structured rituals (Busuioc & Schillemans, 
2014) and often occur under conditions of political stress or controversy (Romzek 
& Dubnick, 1987). Instances where credibility is challenged may be called 
µFUHGLELOLW\FULVHV¶SRWHQWLDOO\OHDGLQJWRDFFRXQWDELOLW\SURFHVVHVEHLQJWULJJHUHG
Here, as Schillemans, Van Twist and Vanhommerig (2013) note, there is a 
connection to broader issues of legitimacy. If a body becomes discredited on the 
basis of its credibility, accountability processes may be triggered, during which 
questions of organisational legitimacy and learning capacity are raised (Wood, 
2015). If the credibility challenges a body is experiencing can be resolved via 
accountability processes, and it comes out of a crisis with similar and even 
enhanced credibility, then accountability can be seen to enhance, rather than 
counterbalance or oppose, credibility. 
Types of discourses and credibility challenges 
To understand how credibility may be enhanced by accountability, it is necessary to capture 
the variety of ways in which the validity claims behind agency policies are constructed and 
contested. Above, credibility was defined as a quality of decisions that derives from the 
validity claims they are based upon being successfully defended. The construction and 
contestation of validity claims in political discourses has been seminally theorised by Jürgen 
Habermas. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas distinguishes between three types of 
political problems and corresponding discourses in which validity claims are raised and 
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contested: pragmatic, ethical-political and moral ones (Habermas, 1992/1994).  He views 
these as components of the practical reason that citizens and decision-makers apply in 
DQVZHULQJWKHVXSHURUGLQDWHTXHVWLRQµ:KDWVKDOOZHGR"¶Habermas, 1992/1994, p. 197):  
(1) Pragmatic questions and discourses concern the selection of adequate means for 
given ends. They can give rise to conflicts over facts in which different actors or 
groups try to defend opposing validity claims about facts and causal relationships.  
In pragmatic discourses, speakers try to establish the truth of assumptions or 
premises and seek to derive conclusions for the instrumental adequacy of 
alternative options or strategies. Pragmatic discourses centre on empirical or 
scientific evidence and arguments.  
(2) Ethical-political questions concern matters of identity and community. In 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJGLVFRXUVHVSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLWLHVVHHNWRILQGRXWµZKRZHDUH¶DQG
µKRZZHZDQWWROLYH¶Habermas 1992/1994, p. 198). Ethical-political questions 
may give rise to disputes over what is good for our community at this point in time 
RUDERXWZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDµFRPPRQJRRG¶ 
(3) Moral questions are questions of justice. They concern norms that take the form of 
categorical imperatives: options that entail moral wrongs according to these norms 
may not (and not only: should not) be chosen, even if they promote other goods. 
7KHµFRUUHFWQHVV¶RIPRUDOQRUPVLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIWLPH and place. However, in 
most political communities, there is no consensus on the validity of moral norms 
and priorities between them. Disagreements on moral norms may lead to 
particularly acrimonious conflicts over whether actions or rules are morally correct 
or not and about how conflicting (and perhaps equally accepted) norms should be 
prioritised in their application.  
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In each case there is a question of whether individuals or groups tasked with a particular 
objective are equipped to carry out or achieve the task they have been given, on the basis of 
different criteria. Table 1 below highlights the distinctive features of each dimension. 
Table 1. Dimensions of Credibility Crises 
Dimension Key question Agency functions Policy areas Credibility challenge 
Pragmatic What are 
appropriate 
means to given 
ends? 
Regulation Medicines, food 
safety, cartel 
authorities 
Independence, expertise, 
absence of vested 
interests 
Ethical-
political 
How do we 
want to live as a 
community? 
Development of 
policies, statutory 
instruments and 
guidelines 
Immigration and 
asylum, 
working 
conditions, 
education 
Justification with regard 
to societal interests and 
values 
Moral What does 
justice require? 
Advising 
governments in 
morally 
controversial 
questions 
Assisted dying, 
IVF treatment, 
animal testing 
Deductive consistency 
and coherence with 
moral norms 
Obviously, the three types of questions and discourses can only be distinguished at an 
analytical level, and contestations of credibility will typically involve aspects of all three. 
However, in many political conflicts, one question seems to dominate the others. For 
example, the debate on how to credibly fight climate change is first of all a pragmatic one, 
since most people seem to agree that climate change should be prevented. Immigration is an 
example of an ethical-political question, or rather: one that most societies chose to treat as an 
ethical-political one (what is good for us, now and here?), rather than a moral or pragmatic 
one. Finally, questions such as the permissibility of assisted suicide or research with human 
embryos are typically treated as moral ones.   
The assumption of this article is that expert bodies are set up to take on tasks 
concerning pragmatic, ethical-political or moral questions. Depending on the type of 
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discourse they are supposed to complement, their own design and decision-making processes 
face specific credibility challenges on the basis of these different questions. Table 1 
hypothesises some credibility challenges that respective bodies may face. In the case of 
pragmatic discourses, where debates principally concern specialised factual information, 
FUHGLELOLW\LVVXHVFRQFHUQWKHVXSHULRUH[SHUWLVHRIWKHERG\¶VPHPEHUVDQGWKHLU
independence from both government administration and from potential vested interests. Given 
the specialised scientific evidence involved in assessing, for example, new medical 
technologies or financial market regulation, public engagement is often limited. Therefore, 
FHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWPXVWHQVXUHFRQWURORYHUWKHERG\¶VJRDOVDQd prevent expert domination 
and regulatory capture. By contrast, bodies addressing ethical-political discourses face the 
need to justify their decisions in public. The social and public activities they regulate ± like, 
for example immigration limits or working hours - are issues with wide accessibility and 
contestability among the public, and less insulated by technical considerations. Theoretically, 
then, there is an important question of the congruence between and recommendations of an 
expert body and the interests and values of the population, which may require justification. 
Finally, expert bodies dealing with moral questions face the challenge of a lack of public 
participation within their inner workings. While the questions they deal with can be highly 
specialised, they are also inherently contestable issues of justice and morality. Hence, their 
credibility will depend upon consistency and coherence with moral norms, but also on how 
diverse a range of views on these norms they include in their internal deliberations. We argue 
that it is situations of credibility challenges, if not crises, that accountability processes are 
typically initiated. This is why, in the second part of this paper, we empirically explore three 
cases of expert bodies dealing with credibility crises. 
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Three cases of credibility crises 
We illustrate our argument that expert bodies face different credibility crises and can resolve 
them through accountability processes with three case studies. These case studies serve as a 
preliminary illustration of the theoretical considerations outlined above and are carried out as 
DµWKHRU\-RULHQWHGSURFHVVDQDO\VLV¶EDVHGRQWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIHYHQWV+DOOS
The rationale behind the case selection is, first, that we assume accountability processes to be 
initiated in response to challenges and have therefore selected bodies that underwent some 
kind of crises. Secondly, we have selected bodies that were set up to deal, respectively, with 
pragmatic, ethical-political and moral issues, as we assume challenges and responses to be 
specific to the type of decisions bodies are set up to address. As these case studies are 
explorative and exemplary in nature rather than intended to test hypotheses, the selection is 
thus based on the dependent variable: the occurrence of a credibility crisis, and its resolution, 
in each case. Our claims to generalisability are strictly limited:  we merely want to 
demonstrate the payoff from exploring links between credibility and accountability and to 
identify key factors determining success in securing credibility through accountability 
processes.   
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Table 2. Case Studies and Their Application 
Case study 
agency 
Formation Credibility  Crisis Reconciliation Credibility created 
WKURXJK« 
IQWiG 
(Germany) 
Advisory 
agency to the 
Schroeder 
government 
on funding 
for 
controversial 
drugs 
Pragmatic: 
Disputes about its 
refusal to use cost-
benefit analysis 
common in 
medical economics 
Reduced 
institutional role, 
revised mandate  
Revision of the 
DJHQF\¶VWDVNDQG
mandate by the 
government 
National/German 
Ethics Council 
(Germany) 
Advisory 
council to 
Schroeder 
government 
on bioethical 
policies 
Moral:  
The council was 
perceived to 
represent only a 
one-sided (liberal) 
moral discourse 
Reformed into a 
democratically 
mandated body 
informing wider 
public discourse 
Reconfiguration of 
appointment and legal 
status 
Independent 
Parliamentary 
Standards 
Authority (UK) 
Advisory 
agency to 
Labour 
government 
RQ03V¶
salary and 
expense rates 
Ethical-political: 
Allegations its 
recommendations 
would see unjust 
pay increase for 
MPs 
Eventual 
implementation 
of agency 
recommendations 
Public defence by 
agency of the ethical-
political justification 
for increasing salaries 
The first case, the Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit (Institute for Quality and 
Efficiency in Health Care, IQWiG) in Germany is an exemplary case of an agency in charge 
RIµSUDJPDWLF¶TXHVWLRQVRIGLVWULEXWLQJOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVIRUIXQGLQJFRQWroversial drugs. 
+HUHSKDUPDFHXWLFDOFRPSDQLHVDQGFDPSDLJQJURXSVFRQWHVWHGWKHYDOLGLW\RI,4:L*¶V
scientific methodology for the comparative assessment of new drugs (specifically through 
cost-benefit analysis). The outcome of this was a reduced role for IQWiG. The second case of 
the Nationaler / Deutscher Ethikrat (National/German Ethics Council), set up to advice the 
JRYHUQPHQWRQELRHWKLFDOGHFLVLRQVLVH[HPSODU\RIµPRUDO¶SUREOHPV+HUHWKHFRXQFLO¶V
validity claims were challenged because they were seen as being biased towards a position 
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that sought to liberalise regulation. This crisis was reconciled as the agency became more 
democratic, with a more pluralistic membership and clearer democratic mandate. Lastly, the 
UK Independent Parliamentary StDQGDUGV$XWKRULW\,36$H[HPSOLILHVµHWKLFDO-SROLWLFDO¶
questions. IPSA was set up to advice on the salaries and expenses of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) after the 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal. The validity claim IPSA made was 
contested by opposition MPs, the media and campaigners who argued it would create unjust 
SD\ULVHVIRU03V'HVSLWHWKHVHFULWLFLVPV,36$¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZHUHLPSOHPHQWHGE\
'DYLG&DPHURQ¶V&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWLQ 
In each case, the agencies survived the crises, retaining credibility through a particular 
accountability process. Our case studies seek to trace the factors leading to these outcomes. 
:HILQGWKDWDUHYLVLRQRIWKHDJHQF\¶VWDVNDQGPDQGDWHE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWFDVH
reconfiguration of its appointment procedures and legal status (case 2), and public 
justification by the agency itself (case 3) were critical (column 5, table 2). The cases thus 
exemplify the argument that credibility is not antithetical to accountability, but integral. 
CASE 1: Pragmatic crisis - the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, 
Germany  
IQWiG was set up as an independent expert advisory body in 2004 by the red-green coalition 
government in Germany as part of a major reform package aiming to improve health care 
provision. The health care system was one of the first reform targets of the Schröder 
government, elected in 1998. The social democrats were critical of rising co-payments and 
insurance contribution rates, both of which have regressive distributional effects. Moreover, 
WKH\ZDQWHGWREUHDNWKHSKDUPDFHXWLFDOLQGXVWU\¶VWUDGLWLRQDOVWURQJKROGLQ*HUPDQKHDOWK
politics and redirect resources from drugs to service provision and prevention. In 2003, a 
positive list for drugs had passed the Bundestag, which was supposed to render the default for 
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coverage decisions negative: no drug would have been covered without an explicit appraisal 
decision. However, this list was blocked in the Bundesrat.  Inspired by the model of the 
already successful British NICE (National Institute for Clinical Excellence), the red-green 
government nonetheless stuck with its goal of introducing cost-benefit analysis to the German 
healthcare system.  
Originally, IQWiG was to be modelled after a blueprint of NICE to make authoritative 
recommendations in decisions concerning coverage of controversial drugs. However, these 
plans were opposed by manufacturers and providers, so IQWiG was eventually equipped with 
fewer competences than intended. Compared to NICE, technology assessment and appraisal 
(coverage decision-making) are institutionally separated in Germany: coverage decisions are 
taken by a corporatist body representing service providers (contracted doctors and hospitals) 
and health insurance funds (the Federal Joint Committee, FJC). The FJC can charge IQWiG 
with reports, which it can take into account in its decisions. However, it can also draw on 
RWKHUVRXUFHVRIHYLGHQFHDQGLVIUHHQRWWRIROORZ,4:L*¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV7KH
institutional separation of technology assessment from coverage decision-making may 
LQDGYHUWHQWO\KDYHSURPRWHG,4:L*¶VFUHGLELOLW\DVDQLQGHSHQGHQWH[SHUWDJHQF\DVLW
unburdened its members from taking budget considerations into account in their decisions. 
Nonetheless, IQWiG struggled to gain authority in health technology assessment. Its 
first chair, physician Peter Sawicki, was known to be pharma-critical and influenced by the 
&RFKUDQHIRXQGDWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKRIFULWLFDOO\DVVHVVLQJGUXJVIRUFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHLQ
major meta-VWXGLHV8QGHU6DZLFNL¶VPDQDJHPHQW,4:L*GHYHORped a non-standard method 
of technology assessment. In short, IQWiG refused to carry out cost-benefit or cost-utility 
assessments that are standard in health economics. Using methods like the Quality-Adjusted-
Life-Year calculus, these assessments enable a comparison of treatments pairs across different 
conditions, for example the cost-benefit of a drug for hypertension compared with that of a 
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cancer drug. IQWiG, by contrast, insisted on assessing only the comparative benefit of 
different drugs for the same condition, comparing, for example, different drugs for diabetes. 
IQWiG thus evaded the discussion on priority setting and rationing in service provision by 
ruling out a ranking of services which would have enabled the definition of a basic health care 
package. 
:LWKLQH[SHUWFLUFOHV,4:L*¶VPHWKRGZDVVHHQDVSHFXOLDUDQGRSHQO\FULWLFLVHG. 
Sculpher and Claxton, for example, write:  µ%\HIIHFWLYHO\LJQRULQJWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI
resource scarcity, it [IQWiG] fails to inform the German health care system on whether new 
WHFKQRORJLHVRIIHUYDOXH¶ (Sculpher & Claxton, 2010, p. 1135). Kuhlmann et al. argue that 
µ,4:L*VHIILFLHQF\WKUHVKROGLVHQWLUHO\LQDGHTXDWH¶ (Kuhlmann, Schöffski, Schumann, 
Landshut, & Schwarzbach, 2012: p. 123, own translation). While a number of health 
economists criticised IQWiG for its resistance to state-of-the-art cost-benefit analysis and for 
not moving the debate on priority setting ± which most of them deemed necessary ± forward, 
manufacturers, patient groups and the parliamentary opposition were similarly critical. Soon 
after it had taken up its work, IQWiG published a negative report on a group of insulin 
analogs, recommending against funding. Considerable protest from patients, doctors and 
manufacturers resulted. Critics not only pointed out the benefits of insulin analogs and lack of 
alternatives for certain patients, but also accused IQWiG of health care rationing ± a taboo in 
German health politics. Protests dwindled only after insulin analogs were found to increase 
the risk for certain cancers, leading to an abrupt slump in demand.  
:KLOH$QJHOD0HUNHO¶VILUVWJUDQGFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWOHIW,4:L*XQWRXFKHGWKH
conservative-liberal government inaugurated in 2009 was highly critical of its performance, 
and in particular, of its pharma-critical chair. Along with a number of conservative and liberal 
ministers from the German Länder, Philipp Rösler, minister of health after the 2009 election, 
had signed a critical statement on IQWiG that, along with the association of major 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers (Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller, VFA) criticised 
,4:L*DVDWKUHDWWRWKHPDQXIDFWXUHUV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQG*HUPDQ\¶V
attractiveness as a location for industry. Soon DIWHU5|VOHUKDGFRPHLQWRRIILFH6DZLFNL¶V
contract as IQWiG chairman was up for renewal. After an auditing firm commissioned by 
5|VOHUKDGIRXQGLUUHJXODULWLHVUHJDUGLQJ6DZLFNL¶VFRPSDQ\FDUWKHFRQWUDFWZDVQRW
renewed and CDU-member Jürgen Windeler was appointed as new chair by the ministry of 
health.  
In 2011, a new law initiated by the conservative-liberal government 
(Arzneimittelneuordnungsgesetz) changed the German system of drug appraisal completely. 
In essence, this law reversed explicit rationing, instead introducing price negotiations with 
manufacturers. Under this new drug appraisal regime, IQWiG supports negotiations with 
reports on the comparative advantage of drugs. In its new role, IQWiG is no longer under 
pressure to either justify its methodology (as it is not expected to carry out cost-benefit 
assessments) nor under attack for recommending rationing decisions. While according to its 
chair and the ministry, IQWiGs has been strengthened, its new role is purely advisory and 
hardly noticed in public. 
7KHVWRU\RI,4:L*¶VFUHGLELOLW\FULVLVFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVIROORZV,4:L*ZDV
originally set up to advance the introduction of cost-benefit assessment, and eventually 
explicit rationing, into German health politics (see Landwehr & Böhm 2016). While this was 
a clear goal of the red-green coalition government, the German public was mostly opposed to 
it. Under these conditions, the establishment of IQWiG and the commissioning of its sister 
body, the FJC, with rationing tasks were an attempt to both avoid electoral blame and win 
support and credibility for the respective policy program. However, an agency can only gain 
credibility in pragmatic discourses if the goals for which it seeks to provide adequate 
instruments are consensual, which was clearly not the case for IQWiG. Sensing public 
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resistance to rationing, IQWiG adopted a less controversial methodology, but was nonetheless 
attacked as a rationing institution. In the end, it proved neither willing nor able to gain support 
for cost-benefit assessments, but was equally unable to attain public support. While it was not 
terminated, IQWiG was practically reprogrammed to support price negotiations with 
manufacturers. Its credibility in this new, more circumscribed and less controversial role has 
not been challenged. For its original task, however, IQWiG did not achieve authority 
alongside its credible commitment. 
CASE 2: Moral crisis - the National Ethics Council and German Ethics Council, 
Germany.  
In the years 2000/2001, German politics was confronted with a deep bioethical conflict. New 
research in the United States indicated a high potential of studies using human embryonic 
stem cells. Producing embryonic stem cells, which at the time inevitably meant killing human 
embryos, was not allowed in Germany. However, German researchers had tried to import 
stem cells from the US, making the attempt public to force the legislator to take action and 
close what was seen as a gap in legislation, thus achieving legal certainty. The decision was 
made difficult by the fact that the government and each of the four parliamentary parties were 
as much internally divided over the issue as the German public. One side argued that by 
ruling out research with embryonic stem cells in Germany would mean denying desperately 
ill patients hope for a cure, but also damaged international competitiveness. The other side 
argued that by enabling the import of stem cell lines would create demand for new ones and 
eventually embryos to be killed abroad. This side not only saw the issue as about protecting 
human life and dignity, but also feared a slippery slope eventually leading to genetic 
engineering and euthanasia. 
Chancellor Schröder took a liberal stance on bioethical questions, including research 
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with human embryonic stem cells, but was cautious not to raise resistance from his own party 
and the public. Seeking to advance the bioethics debate, he set up the National Ethics 
Council, an independent advisory body, in April 2001. The National Ethics Council was 
staffed with 25 members, mostly university professors from different disciplinary 
backgrounds, but with a clear dominance of natural scientists and scholars taking a liberal 
stance on bioethics. Although the Council produced its first report on the import of embryonic 
stem cells cDXWLRXVO\QRWDUULYLQJDWDXQDQLPRXVYHUGLFWLWZDVFULWLFLVHGDV6FKU|GHU¶V
µQRGGLQJWKURXJK-ERG\¶RUµUXEEHUVWDPS¶VHHReich, 2010, p. 33; Rogalla 2001; Thelen, 
2001). The accusation was that Schröder had set up the Council not to enrich the discourse on 
bioethics, but to legitimate his own liberal position. Bogner and Menz (2002) take a more 
nuanced position, arguing the point in setting up the Council was to demonstrate even experts 
would not arrive at a moral consensus and that a political decision was necessary and 
LQHYLWDEOH:KDWHYHU6FKU|GHU¶VWUXHPRWLYHVZHUHWKH1DWLRQDO(WKLFV&RXQFLOZDVXQDEOHWR
JDLQFUHGLELOLW\GXHWRLWVµELUWKGHIHFW¶RIEHLQJVHWXSE\GHFUHHDQGODFNLQJDGHPRFUDWLF
mandate.  
Not only opposition politicians (Hüppe, 2004; Zimmermann, 2005), but also experts 
in the parliamentary study commission on bioethics criticised the National Ethics Council for 
lacking a democratic mandate (Dpa, 2001). Jens Reich summarises: 
7KHSXEOLFUHFHSWLRQRIWKHµ1DWLRQDO(WKLFV&RXQFLO¶V¶UHSRUWVDQGHYHQWVZDVEURDGEXW
almost exclusively negative. It was criticised that the Ethics Council could not agree on 
consensual points of view and instead tried to achieve fairness by pointing out 
controversial standpoints and alternative options for action. But in particular, its 
illegitimate birth out of the will of the executive was permanently branded. Nonetheless, 
the actual influence on political decisions and the public awareness of bioethical 
problems remained rather low (Reich, 2012, p. 29, own translation). 
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In 2007, the new grand coalition government (Merkel I) changed the legal status of the Ethics 
Council and its members. A law drafted by the ministry of education and research passed the 
Bundestag with a large majority in April 2007, FKDQJLQJWKHQDPHRIWKHFRXQFLOWRµ*HUPDQ
(WKLFV&RXQFLO¶DQGLWVDSSRLQWPHQWSURFHGXUHKDOIRIWKHFRXQFLO¶VPHPEHUVDUHQRZ
appointed by the Bundestag, the other half by the federal government. Despite the council 
being given a stronger democratic mandate, critics did not fall silent. The Left party and the 
Greens continued to bemoan its liberal bias and lack of democratic legitimation (as the small 
Bundestag opposition effectively had hardly any influence on appointments), and several MPs 
argued parliamentary study commissions were more adequate forums for bioethical 
discussions.    
In subsequent years, the Council produced a number of highly controversial reports. A 
report in which a slim majority of members supported the introduction of pre-implantation 
diagnostics under tight restrictions was criticised both as too restrictive and too permissive. A 
proposal to lift the ban on sex between adult siblings met severe criticism from conservative 
politicians and Catholic clerics. However, these occasional attacks on the Council are part of a 
wider democratic discourse on bioethics in which the council has become recognised as a 
OHJLWLPDWHDQGWUXVWZRUWK\YRLFHEHVLGHVRWKHUV1RZWKHFRXQFLO¶VIXQFWLRQLQYROYHV
enriching the discourse rather than advising the government on steps to take. Despite the birth 
defects of its predecessor, the German Ethics Council may even be seen as complementing 
and democratising the German debate on bioethics. As Kai Arzheimer (2015) shows, the 
resistance to liberalisation may be sustained by a Christian democratic / New Left issue 
coalition that has less backing in the German public. While its recommendations may often be 
lopsided towards liberal positions, the council thus closes certain argumentative gaps in the 
discourse.  
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In sum, the case study of the National/German Ethics Council shows that an 
independent expert body can contribute to moral discourses by providing arguments and 
DVVHVVLQJWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWSRVLWLRQV+RZHYHUWKH1DWLRQDO(WKLFV&RXQFLO¶VELUWK
GHIHFWDV6FKU|GHU¶VµUXEEHU-VWDPS¶ERG\GHSULYHGLWRIDQ\FKDQFHWRJDLQµH[WHUQDO¶
credibility. Only its re-establishment as a democratically authorised forum for bioethical 
debate in 2007 allowed it to gain public acceptance. Despite the authority the Council has 
gained, its reports are viewed as one among many voices in the bioethical discourse rather 
than as recommendations to the government that could be implemented without further 
discussion and complex decision-making processes.  
Case 3: Ethical-political crisis - The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, 
UK.  
The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) is a non-majoritarian institution 
set up in the UK in 2009 by the Parliamentary Standards Act (2009, c.13). Its job is to 
µUHJXODWHWKHH[SHQVHVV\VWHP¶ZLWKLQWKH8.QDWLRQDOSDUOLDPHQWDQGµDGPLQLVWHUDQGSay 
03V¶H[SHQVHVDQGWKHLUVDODULHV¶6HWXSLQUHVSRQVHWRDFULVLVLQZKHQWKHTelegraph 
newspaper uncovered evidence of MPs abusing their right to claim parliamentary expenses, 
including, for example, the purchase of a duck house for a country estate, IPSA is a classic 
H[DPSOHRIDERG\HVWDEOLVKHGWRDGMXGLFDWHRQµHWKLFDO-SROLWLFDO¶LVVXHVVHH7DEOH
Whereas before the crisis, expense claims were managed internally by parliamentary staff, 
DQGDFRPPLWWHHRI03VGHFLGHGRQ03V¶SD\OHYHOVIROOowing the crisis it was deemed that 
µ7KHSXEOLFZDQWWRKDYHIXOOFRQILGHQFHLQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\V\VWHP«VRWKDWWKHFORXGRI
VXVSLFLRQLVOLIWHGDQGWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIWKH+RXVH>RI&RPPRQV@FDQEHUHVWRUHG¶+DQVDUG
23 Jun 2009, Vol.494, part 97, Col.678).  
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,36$¶VµH[WHUQDO¶FUHGLELOLW\KHQFHUHVWHGXSRQWKHLGHDLWZRXOGVHW03V¶H[SHQVHV
DQGVDODULHVDWDQDFFHSWDEOHOHYHODQGZRXOGSUHYHQWµJDPLQJ¶RIWKHV\VWHP,36$ZDVVHHQ
DVDJXDUGLDQRISXEOLFPRQH\DLPLQJLQLWVRZQZRUGVWRHQVXUHµWKHKighest standards of 
LQWHJULW\DQGPRUDOLW\¶,36$S$VSDUWRI,36$¶VUHPLWLWZDVFKDUJHGZLWK
UHFRPPHQGLQJDµQHZVHWWOHPHQW¶IRUKRZPXFK03VDQGPLQLVWHUVVKRXOGEHSDLG,WVUHSRUW
FLUFXODWHGLQ-XQHVSDUNHGDµFUHGLELOLW\FULVLV¶ 
$IWHUOHQJWK\FRQVXOWDWLRQ,36$SURSRVHG03V¶VDODU\EHRQSDUZLWKRWKHUSDUWVRI
the civil service, starting at £74,000 in 2015 (a 10.3% one-off increase) indexed to annual 
growth in average earnings thereafter (IPSA, 2013, pp.7-8). These recommendations were 
met with staunch public opposition. In the consultation period from 11 July-20 October IPSA 
received 550 written responses, 530 posts on its website, and 3,450 responses to an online 
survey. The online survey showed a large majority against the proposals ± 12% for with 88% 
against. Moreover, a ComRes poll commissioned by IPSA showed significant opposition to 
any pay increase for MPs. 66% were against it, compared to 24% in favour. When asked the 
same question with the caveat that any rise would not increase costs to the taxpayer, more 
respondents were still opposed than for (45% to 43%). 
At this stage the proposals were particularly contentious, described by Prime Minister 
'DYLG&DPHURQDVµVLPSO\XQDFFHSWDEOH¶Syal, 2015). The first pay increase was not 
scheduled, however, until after the 2015 elections. In 2015 IPSA conducted another public 
FRQVXOWDWLRQLQYHVWLJDWLQJZKHWKHULWVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVVKRXOGFKDQJHDIWHUµWDN>LQJ@LQWR
account all relevant circumstances as part of our review of our deteUPLQDWLRQRI03V¶SD\¶
(IPSA, 2015a, p. 10). In June 2015 the second consultation was published, and, surprisingly, 
,36$VWRRGLWVJURXQGDERXWWKHQHHGIRUDQLQFUHDVHDUJXLQJµZHFDQVHHQRFOHDUUHDVRQ
why the economic circumstances today should lead us to depart from the determination of 
£74,000 that we reached in December (IPSA, 2015a, p. 11). 
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This led several MPs to state they would give any increase to charity, while 57,000 
people signed a petition against the pay rise. Analysing the reasons given, it is clear that the 
ethical-SROLWLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVZHUHSXWFHQWUHVWDJH$FFXVDWLRQVRIµK\SRFULV\¶ZHUHEDQGHG
around and contrasts drawn with low paid groups in society. The proposal was contrasted 
ZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDODXVWHULW\SURJUDPPHZLWK REMHFWLRQVVWDWLQJLWVHQWWKHµZURQJ
PHVVDJH¶LQWLPHVRIVXSSRVHGIUXJDOLW\$VRQHSDUOLDPHQWDULDQFRPPHQWHGµ,«DFFHSWWKDW
there is never a good time to implement this. However, you have decided to choose the 
:25673266,%/(7,0(WRGRWKLV¶IPSA, 2015). 
Tasked with producing an ethically sound set of guidelines, IPSA confounded those 
expectations by proposing a substantial increase. The upshot was a crisis for IPSA and its 
µFUHGLELOLW\¶ZDVWKURZQLQWRGRXEW+RZHYHUIROORZLQJWKH0D\HOHFWLRQ,36$¶V
recommendations were implemented for the new parliament, beginning in September 2015. 
After opposing its June 2015 report, David Cameron confirmed support for the 
recommendation on July 16th VWDWLQJµ,W¶VDPDWWHUIRU,36$«\RX¶UHSDLG a rate for 
WKHMREDQG\RXVKRXOGWDNHWKHUDWHIRUWKHMREDQGLW¶VGRQHLQGHSHQGHQWO\¶Syal, 2015). The 
pay rise was hence not overruled by the Conservative administration. 
This remarkable about-WXUQWR,36$¶VSRVLWLRQE\&DPHURQZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\
contextual factors. Firstly, once the pay increase was accepted, it became an individual matter 
for MPs whether they chose to take it, or, as several subsequently did, donate it to charity. In 
this sense, the fact IPSA was an advisory rather than executive body meant its 
µUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ¶ZDVOHVVWR[LF$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHUWKHDGYLVRU\QDWXUHRI,36$¶V
UROHPHDQWLWVGHFLVLRQZDVPRUHRSHQWRFRQWHVWDWLRQ$VRQHFRPPHQWDWRUDGYLVHG,36$¶V
decisions could be made less contestable by giving it greater foUPDOSRZHUµ0DNH,36$¶V
DQQXDOSD\DZDUGVELQGLQJ$QGQHXWUDOLVHWKHLVVXH¶(Hodges, 2015). Other aspects of 
,36$¶VDJHQGDKDGVLJQLILFDQWVXSSRUWVXFKDVWLJKWO\FRQWUROOLQJSDUOLDPHQWDU\H[SHQVHV
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DQGµQDPLQJDQGVKDPLQJ¶03VZKRIDLOHGWRUHSD\GHEWV owed on parliamentary credit cards. 
So, in this sense, IPSA arguably had a surplus of political capital in other areas it could 
H[SHQGRQWKHVSHFLILFLVVXHRI03V¶VDODULHV 
$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHUWKHLVVXHRI03V¶VDODULHVZDVVWLOOWR[LFDQGRQHZith 
high opposition in the media and public, so how it retained its credibility still represents a 
puzzle. It seems that the way IPSA acted was crucial to its success: IPSA did not back down 
in re-VWDWLQJWKHFDVHIRUµIDLUQHVV¶,Q,36$¶V&KLHI([HFXWLYH0DUFLDO%RRVWDWHGµ:H
want to have good people doing the job and they need to be paid fairly¶Dearden, 2014). 
In its final report IPSA reaffirmed its thinking, whilst acknowledging the criticism 
µ,36$ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGDVDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHJXODWRULQRUGHUWRWDNHGLIILFXOWGHFLVLRQV«ZH
have not seen anything by way of evidence that is new or compelling such as to cause us to 
FKDQJHRXUGHFLVLRQ>«@¶,36$ES,36$DFNQRZOHGJHGGLVDJUHHPHQWEXW
argued MPs should receive fair pay for the work they undertook. In this case, then, the agency 
managed an ethical-political credibility crisis by showing ethical leadership ± acknowledging 
the issue was contested, but sticking to a principled stance in order to re-assert its credibility 
against public onslaught. 
Discussion: Meeting the credibility challenge through accountability processes 
Our analysis adds a new angle to understanding the credibility challenges faced by expert 
agencies. To reiterate, credibility is not institutionalised simply through institutional 
LQGHSHQGHQFHDQGµFRPPLWPHQW¶,WLVDOVRREWDLQHGLQFRQWHVWVRYHUWKHYDOLGLW\FODLPV
decisions are based upon. This argument calls attention to how more or less independent 
expert bodies deal with challenges through accountability processes, and in turn, what forms 
of accountability might effectively manage public contestation. While we cannot say whether 
KLJKO\VWUXFWXUHGDFFRXQWDELOLW\µPHFKDQLVPV¶FUHDWHFUHGLELOLW\ZHFDQDUJXHWKDW
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accountability processes are an important part of what makes public perceptions of credibility 
achievable. From our case studies, it is possible to identify three ways in which expert bodies 
obtain and defend credibility in times of crisis via accountability processes: state intervention 
and revision of competencies (Case 1); meta-deliberation over how agencies are designed and 
provided with a democratic mandate (Case 2), and voluntary public communication (Case 
3).(see Koop, 2013; Landwehr, 2015). 
Firstly, IQWiG became externally credible via a revision of its goals and tasks, such 
that those goals matched public expectations. The government reduced its competencies such 
that credibility was secured only when it was clear IQWiG was not overstretching its mandate 
by institutionalising a form of decision making that was accepted neither by the German 
public nor by the academic community. Here, accountability via health ministry intervention 
HQDEOHGWKHDJHQF\WRUHYLVHLWVµFUHGLEOHFODLP¶± from being the major institution responsible 
for recommending drug funding decisions to providing only an information base. The lesson 
for institutional design is that competencies of expert bodies in politics should be 
challengeable and revisable in response to contestation (Landwehr, 2013, p. 310). 
Secondly, the German Ethics Council was given a clearer democratic mandate so its 
composition and decisions were credible in the face of accusations of bias. This mode of 
UHIRUPFDQEHVHHQDVDQLQVWDQFHRIµmeta-delibeUDWLRQ¶ about institutional design, or 
µGHFLGLQJKRZWRGHFLGH¶DQGGHPRFUDWLFOHJLWLPDWLRQ7KH*HUPDQ(WKLFV&RXQFLOFDVH
shows that accountable meta-deliberation and the resulting new mandate and composition of 
the body were crucial to obtaining credibility. 
/DVWO\,36$VHFXUHGFUHGLELOLW\E\MXVWLI\LQJLWVSURSRVDOVRQ03V¶SD\SXEOLFO\7KLV
ODVWFDVHVKRZVWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGDOVRJLYHµYROXQWDULO\DFFRXQW¶.RRSRIWKHLU
GHFLVLRQVWRWKHSXEOLFµ,IDQDSSRLQWHGERG\¶VGHFLVLRQVDUHUHSHDWHGO\ challenged by the 
public and fail to be accepted and implemented, this may indicate not a failure of the body 
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LWVHOIEXWGHILFLHQFLHVLQLWVLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQ¶/DQGZHKU$VVXFKIRUPVRI
stakeholder and public engagement can be seen as crucial accountability processes allowing 
agencies to secure credibility. Agencies should be required and resourced to justify the 
validity claims their decisions are based upon to the public, in a way that complements their 
LQWHUQDOµFRPPLWPHQW¶WRFUHGLEOHdecision-making. 
Conclusion: beyond credibility versus accountability 
7KLVDUWLFOHKDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHSXEOLFSHUFHSWLRQVRIDQH[SHUWERG\¶VFUHGLELOLW\GHSHQGXSRQ
the outcomes of dynamic accountability processes. Expert bodies face differential challenges 
tRWKHLUGHFLVLRQVWKDWFDQEHFDVWDVµFUHGLELOLW\FULVHV¶DQGUHVROXWLRQVWRWKHVHFULVHVYDU\
We pointed out that a central function of expert bodies in politics is to complement discourses 
and decision-making processes that can be classified ± following Habermas - as moral, 
ethical-political, and pragmatic ones. Our empirical analysis illustrates the contested roles 
expert bodies have in politics.  Hence, how they should be legitimated as forms of governance 
represents a substantive challenge rather than one that can be resolved through a priori 
normative theorising. We have identified some specific accountability processes ± 
intervention to revise competencies, meta-deliberation and reform of institutional design, and 
engagement in public justification ± that can help complement internal credible commitment 
with external recognition of credibility.  
Our theoretical considerations and empirical findings might also have implications for 
future research on credibility. Our focus has been on accountability processes through which 
credibility is obtained and defended. Scholars studying the role of agencies and experts in 
democracy should develop theories of how credibility is developed in response to contestation 
and through accountability mechanisms, rather than seeing the two in opposition. 
Accountability on the one hand and credibility on the other are two sides of the same coin 
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rather than opposing logics. Credibility should be seen as obtained as a result of 
accountability mechanisms rather than as a Madisonian check on majoritarian will. Designing 
closer studies of accountability mechanisms enacted by governments, agencies and expert 
bodies can improve our understanding of how accountability and credibility can work 
together. Finally, this article should encourage governance scholars to question assumptions 
DERXWDJHQF\LQGHSHQGHQFHEHLQJWKHSULPDU\GHWHUPLQDQWRIµFUHGLELOLW\¶EHFDXVHLQWHUQDO
µFRPPLWPHQW¶WRFUHGLEOHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJQHHGVWREHFRPSOHPHQWHGZLWKWKHSHUFHSWLRQE\
important audiences thDWDJHQF\GHFLVLRQVDUHµFUHGLEOH¶ 
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Table 1. Dimensions of Credibility Crises 
Dimension Key question Agency functions Policy areas Credibility challenge 
Pragmatic What are 
appropriate 
means to given 
ends? 
Regulation Medicines, food 
safety, cartel 
authorities 
Independence, expertise, 
absence of vested 
interests 
Ethical-
political 
How do we 
want to live as a 
community? 
Development of 
policies, statutory 
instruments and 
guidelines 
Immigration and 
asylum, 
working 
conditions, 
education 
Justification with regard 
to societal interests and 
values 
Moral What does 
justice require? 
Advising 
governments in 
morally 
controversial 
questions 
Assisted dying, 
IVF treatment, 
animal testing 
Deductive consistency 
and coherence with 
moral norms 
 
Table 2. Case Studies and Their Application 
Case study 
agency 
Formation Credibility  Crisis Reconciliation Credibility created 
WKURXJK« 
IQWiG 
(Germany) 
Advisory 
agency to the 
Schroeder 
government 
on funding 
for 
controversial 
drugs 
Pragmatic: 
Disputes about its 
refusal to use cost-
benefit analysis 
common in 
medical economics 
Reduced 
institutional role, 
revised mandate  
Revision of the 
DJHQF\¶VWDVNDQG
mandate by the 
government 
National/German 
Ethics Council 
(Germany) 
Advisory 
council to 
Schroeder 
government 
on bioethical 
policies 
Moral:  
The council was 
perceived to 
represent only a 
one-sided (liberal) 
moral discourse 
Reformed into a 
democratically 
mandated body 
informing wider 
public discourse 
Reconfiguration of 
appointment and legal 
status 
Independent 
Parliamentary 
Advisory 
agency to 
Labour 
Ethical-political: 
Allegations its 
recommendations 
Eventual 
implementation 
Public defence by 
agency of the ethical-
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Standards 
Authority (UK) 
government 
RQ03V¶
salary and 
expense rates 
would see unjust 
pay increase for 
MPs 
of agency 
recommendations 
political justification 
for increasing salaries 
 
 
 
